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Are Banks Within the European 
Community Adequately Supervised? 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past two decades, the international banking industry 
has been the subject of several scandals. In 1974, due to foreign 
currency trading losses, the Herstatt Bank of Germany collapsed 
when it was unable to meet its obligations to other banks.! In 1982, 
Banco Ambrosiano was shut down when $1.4 billion was unac-
counted for and customer withdrawals diminished the bank's nec-
essary working capital,2 The largest and most scandalous banking 
event by far was the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) inJuly 1991 which resulted in a loss of at least 
$9.25 billion for creditors.3 Essentially, the bank was not supervised 
adequately4 and the authorities did not discover its fraudulent prac-
tices until the damage was irreparable. 
Responding to these banking scandals, the Commission of the 
European Communities (Commission) adopted several Directives to 
prevent future banking disasters.5 The Council of Ministers (Coun-
cil) also implemented certain standards within the European Com-
munity (EC) to supervise the operations of credit institutions.6 The 
primary goal of these actions is "to protect savings and to create 
equal conditions for competition" between credit institutions.7 In 
1 Herstatt's Demise, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1992, available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, 
Inti File. 
2 Alan Friedman, Mystery Without Thrills, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at 18. 
3 EC Commission Seeks To Draw Lessons from BCCI Case, Reuters Eur. Community Rep., Oct. 
23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inti File. 
4 See The Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES: THE BANKER, Feb. 1993. 
5Id.; First Council Directive 77/780 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 
pmbl., 1977 OJ. (L 322) 30 [hereinafter First Banking Directive]; Directive 83/350 on the 
Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, pmbl., 1983 OJ. (L 193) 18 
[hereinafter 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision]; Second Council Directive 89/646 
on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the 
Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 
pmbl., 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]; Council Directive 92/30 
on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, pmbl., 1992 OJ. (L 110) 
52 [hereinafter 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision]. 
6 See The Bottom Line, supra note 4. 
7 First Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
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1977, the Council enacted the First Banking Directive, which was 
the initial step in a series of Directives attempting to create an 
internal EC banking market and establishing certain guidelines for 
supervision of credit institutions.s In 1983, the Council adopted the 
Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consoli-
dated Basis (1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision), attempt-
ing to further unifY the EC banking market and to specifY which 
Member State is responsible to supervise certain credit institutions.9 
In 1989, the Second Banking Directive introduced a single banking 
license and clarified the role of Member States in the supervision 
of specific operations of credit institutions. lO Despite the enactment 
of these specific Directives, banks such as the BCCI were not super-
vised properly, and their fraudulent acts went undetected. Thus, in 
1992 the Council re-examined the banking Directives and decided 
that changes were necessary in order to prevent further BCCI-type 
scandals. On April 6, 1992, the Council adopted Council Directive 
on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis 
(1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision) which repealed the 
1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervisionll and provided for the 
supervision of financial holding companies and mixed activity hold-
ing companiesP 
This Comment discusses the Council Directives dealing with the 
supervision of the EC banking market. Part I focuses on the First 
Banking Directive, the 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, 
and the Second Banking Directive. Part II examines the most recent 
Directive adopted by the Council, the 1992 Directive on Consoli-
dated Supervision. Part III discusses whether measures taken by the 
Council are adequate to prevent incidents similar to the BCCI scan-
dal. This Comment concludes that the Council has taken adequate 
measures through these Directives to reasonably safeguard against 
undetected illegal acts by credit institutions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The First Banking Directive 
The First Banking Directive was the first attempt by the Council 
to create an EC banking market. It attempted to harmonize banking 
8 [d. 
91983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, pmbl. 
10 Second Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
II 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
12 !d. art. 10. 
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laws and eliminate certain barriers to providing banking services 
throughout the EC.13 Essentially, the First Banking Directive prohib-
its Member States from discriminating against credit institutions 
established in other states. 14 For instance, a host Member Statel5 
must establish the same requirements for credit institutions that 
operate in its territory as those of a credit institution that makes the 
territory its "home."16 The First Banking Directive, however, does not 
require that a Member State authorize all institutions to operate 
within the Member State's territoryP In order to operate within a 
territory, a credit institution must meet certain authorization re-
quirements. ls Although the Council eventually aims to introduce 
uniform authorization requirements throughout the EC, the First 
Banking Directive only specifies minimum requirements which 
Member States must implement. 19 
Even if all the Member States had the same authorization require-
ments, the institution still must obtain the authority to operate 
within a certain territory.2o Member States are not required to auto-
matically accept a credit institution.21 They still have discretion as to 
which institutions operate within their territory.22 In addition, a 
credit institution may have to meet different solvency and liquidity 
standards among host Member States.23 Thus, a unified banking 
market is not possible under the First Banking Directive because 
Member States still could use their boundaries as barriers within the 
EC. 
Moreover, the Member State which authorizes an institution 
13 See First Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. By implementing uniform banking laws, 
the EC does not mandate the enactment of identical laws by Member States. See Benis E. 
Bernstein, The European Econamic Cammunity and the United States Take Their Places in the 
International Financial Marketplace, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 169, 169 n.6 (1991). 
14 First Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 4. 
15 A host state or country refers to the Member State in which a credit institution operates, 
when the institution is established in another Member State (home state or country). Second 
Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 1 (8). 
16 First Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 4(1). 
17 See First Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 3. 
18 Authorization is defined as an instrument which, when granted by authorities, allows a 
credit institution to carryon business. Id. art. 1. 
19 Id. pmbl. For example, the competent authorities shall authorize a credit institution only 
if they have separate "own" funds, adequate minimum "own" funds and at least two persons 
effectively directing the institution's operations. Id. Furthermore, the First Banking Directive 
states that these persons must have a good reputation and sufficient experience to perform 
their duties. Id. art. 3(2). 
20 Id. art. 3(1). 
21Id. art. 3(2). 
22 First Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
23 Id. art. 6(1). 
216 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vo!. XVII, No.1 
to operate within its boundaries is responsible to supervise that 
institution. Therefore, a credit institution authorized to operate 
branches throughout the EC may be supervised by more than eleven 
different authorities. Under this structure, supervising authorities 
were unsure of who was actually supervising which activities. Thus, 
assuming other authorities were supervising certain activities, several 
fraudulent operations went undetected. 
B. The 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision 
The Directive on Consolidated Supervision, enacted in 1983, re-
quires the consolidated supervision of credit institutions' financial 
conditions, including those credit or financial institutions whose 
parent company is also a credit institution.24 The supervising author-
ity must combine the financial data of the parent and its subsidiaries 
to determine if the parent credit institution meets the supervisory 
standards.25 As a result, the supervising authority can assess realisti-
cally the credit institution's financial status, and determine the sta-
bility and soundness of that institution. The 1983 Directive on Con-
solidated Supervision, however, applies only to parent companies 
that are also credit institutions,26 and relies on the willingness of the 
Member States to exchange the necessary information.27 
The authorities in the home Member State of a parent credit 
institution's head office are responsible for the consolidated super-
vision.28 Supervision by the home Member State may be exercised 
in connection with the authorities of the host Member State of the 
subsidiary institutions.29 Thus, a particular branch may be under the 
supervision of two or more authorities. This concurrent supervision 
avoids competition between the consolidated group of credit insti-
24 See 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, pmb!. 
25 [d. art. 3(1). Conservative standards have been enacted to decrease the risk and to 
safeguard depositor's funds. See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 172 n.29. 
26 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, pmb!' In order to fall within 
the scope of the 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, the parent credit institution 
must "participate" in the ownership of the subsidiary institution. [d. The direct or indirect 
ownership of 25% or more of the capital of another credit or financial institution would 
qualify a parent company as "participating" in the other institution. [d. art. 1. If participation 
is greater than 50%, consolidation is mandatory, and the authorities of the home Member 
State of the parent credit institution shall require either a full or pro rata consolidation. [d. 
art. 4(1). Between the range of 25 and 50% participation, the Member States have flexibility 
as to supervision. [d. arts. 4(2), 4(3). 
27 See id. arts. 5(1), 5(2). 
28 [d. art. 3(3). 
29 [d. pmb!. 
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tutions and the domestic credit institutions of the countries where 
the members of the group are located.30 
By requiring consolidated supervision, the 1983 Directive on Con-
solidated Supervision ensures that credit institutions do not avoid 
compliance with supervisory standards by shifting assets or activities 
to or between subsidiaries.31 As a result, the 1983 Directive on Con-
solidated Supervision ensures that supervising authorities are not 
focusing on a tainted picture of the financial condition of a credit 
institution. By looking at the entire entity, the authorities can better 
assess whether the institution as a whole is sound and stable. 
C. The Second Banking Directive 
The Commission adopted the Second Banking Directive in 1989, 
and it expands the philosophy of the First Banking Directive and 
the 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision.32 The Second Bank-
ing Directive requires that by January 1993 each Member State 
implement the provisions of the Directive into nationallegislation.33 
The central feature of the Second Banking Directive is the single 
banking license recognized throughout the EC.34 Under the Second 
Banking Directive, a credit institution authorized to operate in a 
Member State does not have to obtain further authorization to 
establish another branch in a Member State.35 The issuance of a sin-
gle banking license entitles a credit institution to establish branches 
without barriers by Member States and to offer services freely 
throughout the EC.36 The Second Banking Directive, therefore, nul-
lifies the requirement under the First Banking Directive of multiple 
licenses and expands the stated goal of that Directive of uniform 
banking laws within the EC. 
The basis of the Second Banking Directive rests on the principle 
that each Member State recognizes the banking licenses of the other 
Member States.37 The Second Banking Directive establishes the pro-
30 [d. art. 3(4). 
31 Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New Banking Law of The European Economic 
Community, 25 INT'L LAWYER 1, 24 (1991). 
32 Second Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
33 [d. art. 24(1). As of September 10, 1993, five countries of the EC have implemented this 
Directive-Belgium, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, and Portugal. Therefore, seven coun-
tries of the EC have yet to adopt this Directive. 
34 Second Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
35 [d. art 6(1). 
36 First Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
37 Second Banking Directive, supra note 5, pmbl. 
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cedural measures necessary to create a true internal banking market 
within the EC. A single license provides for effective supervision of 
credit institutions by clarifYing which banking authority is responsi-
ble for the supervision. 
Under the Second Banking Directive, the home Member State of 
a credit institution is responsible to supervise all branches.38 The 
host Member State, however, still has specific rights. For instance, 
the host Member State still may verify authorization and request any 
necessary information.39 It also may monitor liquidity and monetary 
policies.40 Therefore, a credit institution may be supervised by more 
than one Member State throughout the EC. 
The home Member State license applies only to specific banking 
services.41 The home Member State decides which services are cov-
ered under the Second Banking Directive, provided that the services 
do not violate the "general good" of the host Member State.42 Al-
though a certain service may be prohibited within a host Member 
State, a branch may provide the service in the host Member State if 
it is permitted under the laws of the home country.43 Essentially, the 
Commission envisions that competition between branches will lead 
to the enactment of specific legislation within a host Member State 
consistent with the laws of other Member States and therefore unify 
the banking laws within the EC.44 
II. THE 1992 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON THE SUPERVISION OF 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS ON A CONSOLIDATED BASIS 
Although the Commission enacted these specific Directives, the 
collapse of large credit institutions during the past decades high-
lights the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of these Directives. To 
safeguard savings and detect fraud more easily within credit institu-
tions, the Council broadened the scope of the previous Directives. 
On April 6, 1992, the Council adopted the Directive on the Super-
vision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis (1992 Directive 
on Consolidated Supervision). 45 This Directive repealed the 1983 
38 [d. art. 13. 
39 See id. art. 14(1). 
40 [d. arts. 14(1), 14(2). 
41 [d. art. 18 (l), Annex. The banking powers are listed in an annex. [d. 
42 [d.; see also Bernstein, supra note 13, at 177. 
43 See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 177. 
44 See id. 
45 See generally 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5. 
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Directive on Consolidated Supervision and came into effect January 
1, 1993.46 The main justification for this measure is the need to 
require supervision of other banking groups on a consolidated basis, 
a practice already established by the 1983 Directive on Consolidated 
SupervisionY One of the goals of the Directive is to supervise on a 
consolidated basis banking groups whose parent undertaking is not 
a credit institution but instead a "financial holding company."48 A 
"financial holding company" refers to an enterprise whose subsidi-
ary enterprises are either exclusively or mainly credit or financial 
institutions.49 
Supervising credit institutions, together with their financial hold-
ing companies, presents a number of advantages. Primarily, it pro-
vides a realistic assessment of the actual funds of banking groups. 50 
By focusing on a group's risk level and comparing that level of risk 
to the amount of its own funds, the supervisory authorities can assess 
the group's solvency more easily.51 Secondly, consolidating financial 
holding companies, when credit institutions are supervised, places 
a vertically-structured group under the same supervision as horizon-
tally-structured groups. 52 
Another objective of the 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervi-
sion is to supervise banking groups that are neither credit institu-
tions nor financial holding companies, but are instead "mixed-activ-
ity holding companies. "53 In these situations, consolidation is very 
difficult because the groups engage in a variety of activities. 54 The 
1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision alternatively requires a 
mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries to provide any 
information requested by the supervisory authorities.55 
The 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision also reduces the 
amount of ownership needed for an entity to qualify as a "partici-
46Id. arts. 10(1), 10(2). 
47 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Supervision of Credit 
Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, COM(90)451 final at 37 [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
48 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
49Id. 
50 Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 1. 
51Id. 
52Id. at 2. 
53 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
54 Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 2. 
551992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 6(1). Information regard-
ing the group's established relationships, as well as transactions conducted between the 
mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries and the group's credit institutions, in most 
circumstances is requested. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 2. 
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pating" entity.56 The 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision 
defined "participation" as 25 percent ownership.57 Under the 1992 
Directive on Consolidated Supervision, the ownership level, direct 
or indirect, must be 20 percent or more of the voting rights or the 
capital of the undertaking. 58 Thus, under the 1992 Directive on 
Consolidated Supervision, more groups are supervised on a consoli-
dated basis and the stability of an entity can be determined despite 
its corporate structure. 
The 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision does not impose 
any obligation directly on credit institutions.59 The Directive does 
create new obligations indirectly to parent companies of credit in-
stitutions which are not themselves credit institutions.60 These par-
ent companies were not supervised under the Second Banking Di-
rective. The 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision primarily 
increases the responsibility of supervising authorities, requiring 
them to request consolidated accounts and to observe financial 
ratios imposed within the individual Member States.61 
III. DISCUSSION 
The need for the international supervision of banks has surfaced 
in the past two decades due to scandals such as the BCCI incident. 
By enacting a series of Banking Directives, the Council has at-
tempted to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. 
The Council formulated a structure which, if enforced properly, will 
serve its function and adequately supervise the banking industry 
within the EG. 
One of the factors leading to BCCI's closing was that supervisory 
authorities were in different Member States and thus had problems 
with the different languages and cultures.62 Although BCCI was 
registered in Luxembourg, its main operations and management 
were in the United Kingdom; thus, it was unclear which Member 
State had the duty to supervise the operations of the bank.63 The 
Second Banking Directive clarifies this uncertainty by requiring the 
56 See 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
57 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
58 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5, art. 1. 
59 Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 37. 
60 Id. at 37-38. 
61 Id. at 37. 
62 The Blame for BGGI, FIN. TiMES, July 17, 1991, at 22. 
63 See The Bottom Line, supra note 4. 
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home Member State to supervise the operations.54 Therefore, under 
this Directive, Luxembourg would have been responsible to super-
vise BCCI's operations.55 Thus, Second Banking Directive eliminated 
one of the problems enabling fraudulent activities. 
The 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision eliminated an-
other problem by disallowing companies to shift their assets and 
disguise their financial situations.55 By providing for consolidated 
supervision, the Council attempted to ensure that banks' operations 
are sound and stable. The supervising authorities are now required 
to look beyond the corporate form. Furthermore, foreseeing a pos-
sible loophole in the process of supervising credit institutions, the 
Council adopted the 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision. 
This Directive expands consolidated supervision by including finan-
cial holding companies and mixed-activity holding companies. 
Thus, the Council has taken significant precautionary measures to 
ensure that banks are monitored. 57 
These measures by the Council are in full accord with other 
international organizations concerned with the need for interna-
tional supervision of banks. In particular, the "Group of 10"58 
through its Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors has developed 
guidelines consistent with those of the EC.59 Essentially, the Basle 
Committee's guidelines place the supervising responsibility in the 
hands of the home authority70 and strongly favor supervision on a 
consolidated basis.7! Because other organizations, such as the Basle 
Committee, agree with the actions of the Council, presumably the 
measures must have some viability of providing the needed supervi-
sion. 
Overall, however, the effectiveness of these Directives lies in the 
64 Second Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 13. 
65 The Blame for BCCf, supra note 62. 
66 See generally 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 5. 
67 In conjunction with these measures, the Council also passed other Directives which 
provide further safety measures. For example, in 1989, the Council adopted the Own Funds 
and Solvency Ratio Directives, which established coordinated rules on the capital adequacy 
requirements of banks in the Community. See generally Council Directive 89/299 on the Own 
Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 OJ. (L 124) 16; Council Directive 89/647 on a Solvency 
Ratio for Credit Institutions, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 14. Thus, when supervising authorities check 
the operations of a credit institution, they have specific standards that can be applied to every 
institution. 
68 Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Can-
ada,Japan, United States, Sweden, and Switzerland. The Bottom Line, supra note 4. 
69ld. 
70 fd. 
71 Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 13. 
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actual supervisors. The quality of supervision ultimately relies on the 
skill, alertness, experience, and vigor of supervisors. The Council 
has fulfilled its obligation and incorporated the necessary legislation 
to guide the supervisory authorities. By providing specific guidelines 
delineating which authority is responsible for the stability of certain 
institutions and designating which institutions will be examined, the 
possibility of undetected fraud or misconduct diminishes. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1977, the Council of Ministers has taken actions to ensure 
that credit institutions within the European Economic Community 
are supervised adequately. Through its First Banking Directive, the 
Council adopted a basis to create a market for banking services 
within the EC and to provide some degree of supervision. Upon 
discovering that further remedies were needed, the Council adopted 
the Second Banking Directive which expanded the principles under 
the First Banking Directive and clearly established that the home 
Member State is responsible to supervise credit institutions. Foresee-
ing a possible gap in the legislation, the Council passed the 1983 
Directive on Consolidated Supervision which required horizontally-
structured credit institutions to combine their financial status for 
supervising purposes. Foreseeing another possible gap, the Council 
adopted the 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision to require 
consolidated supervision of vertically-structured groups. 
Through these Directives, the Council a·:uempted to take into 
account many possible circumstances which could lead to improper 
supervision. The need for adequate supervision of credit institutions 
is essential to ensure that the institutions are stable and sound and 
thus avoid scandals like BCCr. The Council has accomplished its 
goal to supervise international banks adequately. Incorporating the 
appropriate guidelines for supervisors is possibly the most the Coun-
cil can do. It is now up to the Member States to implement these 
guidelines and advise the appropriate supervisory authorities to do 
their job responsibly. 
Suzette Rodriguez 
